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Abstract 
This short paper sets an elderly care model in which the public elderly care and informal elderly care 
provided by the family are substitutive, with examination of the dynamics of capital accumulation and 
the labor supply. With certain conditions, by virtue of public elderly care, informal elderly care 
vanishes and a full labor supply is achieved. However, this paper presents derivation of the result that 
the economy with informal elderly care is simultaneously socially optimal. 
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1. Introduction 
In OECD countries, demand for elderly care continues to increase. Informal elderly care is needed 
because of their respective aging societies. Therefore, the number of workers that must stop working 
for informal elderly care is about 100,000 persons per year in Japan.1 Why do family members stop 
work? One reason is the prevailing shortage of public elderly care services. One study of the literature 
(Colombo, Llena-Nozal, Mercier and Tjadens 2011) shows that expenditures for public elderly care 
are 1.5% of GDP in OECD countries. Considering the work stoppage problem, that level might be an 
underestimate. What is the work stoppage problem? If the family members stop working, then they 
can not obtain labor income. They fall into poverty. Therefore, it is important to consider compatibility 
between market employment and elderly care. 
This paper sets a model in which public elderly care and informal elderly care provided by the 
family member are substitutive, with examination of how capital accumulation and labor supply are 
determined. This paper presents two steady state equilibriums with informal elderly care and without 
informal elderly care. Moreover, the equilibrium without informal elderly care is not always optimal. 
Some studies specifically examine elderly care. Lundholm and Ohlsson (1998), Tabata (2005), 
Mizushima (2009), Miyazawa (2010), Cremer and Roeder (2013), and Cremer and Pestieau (2014) 
assess subsidies for elderly care and ascertain whether the subsidy should actually be provided. Korn 
and Wrede (2013) and Mou and Winer (2015) set a model with formal and informal elderly care and 
examine how the labor supply is determined. 
Nevertheless, these results are not always obtained in a model in which formal elderly care and 
informal elderly care are substitutive. Substitution between formal and informal elderly care is 
researched empirically by Houtven and Norton (2004), White-Means and Rubin (2004), and Bonsang 
(2009). Therefore, it is worthwhile to set a substitutive model that is consistent with the real economy 
and to examine how informal elderly care is changed by public elderly care. 
The paper structure is the following. Section 2 sets the model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium. 
Section 4 shows the case in which the equilibrium with informal elderly care is optimal. Section 5 
examines the consumption tax for financing for public elderly care service. The final section concludes 
this paper. 
 
2. Model 
This model economy has households, firms, and the government. 
2.1 Household 
Individuals in the household live in two periods: young and old. Utility function ݑ௧ is assumed as 
ݑ௧ = ߙ݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ + ߚ݈݊ܧ௧ + ሺ1 − ߙ − ߚሻ݈݊ܧ௧ାଵ, 0 < ߙ < 1, 0 < ߚ < 1, ߙ + ߚ < 1. (1) 
                                                     
1 Data: Statistics Japan. 
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Individuals care for consumption during the old period ܿ௧ାଵ , the quality of elderly care for their 
parents ܧ௧, and that for themselves ܧ௧ାଵ. Therein, t denotes the period. If younger people live in t 
period, then they live in t+1 period as the old period. They have an altruistic motivation for elderly 
care for their parents. 
The quality of elderly care is assumed to be determined by the input of public elderly care ݃௧ 
and the elderly care time provided by younger people as ݈௧. ܧ௧ is assumed as the following form: 
ܧ௧ = ݃௧ + ݈௧. (2) 
Our paper assumes substitutive elderly care between ݃௧ and ݈௧. 
The budget constraint in the young period is given as 
ݏ௧ = ሺ1 − ߬ሻݓ௧ሺ1 − ݈௧ሻ, (3) 
where ݏ௧ denotes saving for the old period. Also, ݓ௧ and ߬ respectively denote the wage rate and 
income tax rate. Younger people work for the unit of 1 − ݈௧. In the old period, the budget constraint 
is given as 
ܿ௧ାଵ = ሺ1 + ݎ௧ାଵሻݏ௧, (4) 
where ݎ௧ାଵ denotes the interest rate. Then, considering (3) and (4), the lifetime budget constraint is  
ܿ௧ାଵ = ሺ1 + ݎ௧ାଵሻሺ1 − ߬ሻݓ௧ሺ1 − ݈௧ሻ. (5) 
At the maximizing problem of the utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (5), we can 
obtain elderly care time ݈௧ to maximize the utility as 
݈௧ =
ߚ − ߙ݃௧
ߙ + ߚ
, if  ߚ > ߙ݃௧, (6) 
݈௧ = 0, if  ߚ ≤ ߙ݃௧, (7) 
Younger people can provide full time work if sufficient public elderly care is provided. Otherwise, 
younger people must provide informal or family elderly care. The result is based on substitutive elderly 
care between public elderly care and informal family care. With a sufficient level of public elderly 
care, informal elderly care can be reduced. 
 
2.2 Firm 
The firm produces the final goods by inputting the capital stock ܭ௧ and labor ܮ௧. The production 
function ௧ܻ is assumed as 
௧ܻ = ܭ௧ఏܮ௧ଵିఏ, 0 < ߠ < 1. (8) 
With the perfectly competitive market, the wage rate and the interest rate are derived as 
ݓ௧ = ሺ1 − ߠሻܭ௧ఏሺ1 − ݈௧ሻିఏ, (9) 
1 + ݎ௧ = ߠܭ௧ఏିଵሺ1 − ݈௧ሻଵିఏ. (10) 
It is assumed that the capital stock is fully depreciated in a single period. 
 
2.3 Government 
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The government collects income tax revenue from younger people to provide public elderly care. 
Without population growth, the budget constraint of the government is given as shown below: 
݃௧ = ߬ݓ௧ሺ1 − ݈௧ሻ. (11) 
 
3. Equilibrium 
This section presents derivation of the equilibrium in this model. Considering the capital market 
equilibrium condition ܭ௧ାଵ = ݏ௧, the equation below shows the dynamics of capital accumulation: 
ܭ௧ାଵ = ሺ1 − ߬ሻሺ1 − ߠሻܭ௧ఏሺ1 − ݈௧ሻଵିఏ. (12) 
The elderly care time is given to satisfy the following equation: 
݈௧ =
ఉିఈఛ௄೟
ഇሺଵି௟೟ሻషഇ
ఈାఉିఈఛ௄೟
ഇሺଵି௟೟ሻషഇ
. (13) 
For given ܭ௧, we can obtain ܭ௧ାଵ, ݈௧, ݓ௧, ݎ௧ , ܿ௧ and ܧ௧ from (2), (5), (9), (10), (11), (12), and 
(13). Defining the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (13) respectively as L and R, the informal 
elderly care is given by the unique solution for given ܭ௧, as shown by the following figure. 
 
[Insert Fig. 1 around here.] 
 
As shown in Fig. 1, an increase in tax rate ߬ and capital stock ܭ௧ reduce informal elderly care ݈௧ 
because of an increase in public elderly care service ݃௧.2 
Then, the dynamics of ܭ௧ has three patterns of dynamics because an increase in ܭ௧ raises 
ܭ௧ାଵ  directly. However, an increase in ܭ௧  reduces ܭ௧ାଵ  because of a decrease in 1 − ݈௧ . The 
dynamics of capital stock can be depicted as shown below. 
 
[Insert Fig. 2 around here.] 
 
Fig. 2 includes two cases: one for the steady state with ݈௧ < 1 and the other for the steady state 
with ݈௧ = 1. With ݈௧ = 1, the dynamics of ܭ௧ shown by (12) changes to the following equations as3 
ܭ௧ାଵ = ሺ1 − ߬ሻሺ1 − ߠሻܭ௧ఏ. (14) 
  
4. Should Fully Public Elderly Care be Provided? 
                                                     
2 Total differentiation of (13) with respect to ܭ௧ and  ݈௧ derives 
ௗ௟೟
ௗ௄೟
= − ఈ
మఏሺଵିఏሻఛ௄೟ഇషభሺଵି௟೟ሻ
௟೟మቆఉି
ഀഓሺభషഇሻ಼೟
ഇ
ሺభష೗೟ሻഇ
ቇ
మ
ሺଵି௟೟ሻభశഇାఈమఏሺଵିఏሻఛ௄೟ഇ
< 0.  
3 The local stability condition in the case of ݈௧ < 1 can be derived by 0 <
ௗ௄೟శభ
ௗ௄೟
< 1, which is ௗ௄೟శభ
ௗ௄೟
= ߠ +
ఈమఏሺଵିఏሻమఛ௄೟ഇ
௟೟మቆఉି
ഀഓሺభషഇሻ಼೟
ഇ
ሺభష೗೟ሻഇ
ቇ
మ
ሺଵି௟೟ሻభశഇାఈమఏሺଵିఏሻఛ௄೟ഇ
. However, in the case of ݈௧ = 1, the local stability condition always holds 
because of ௗ௄೟శభ
ௗ௄೟
= ߠ. 
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In this section, we examine whether the public elderly care should be fully provided or not to achieve 
݈௧ = 0. The resource constraint in t period is shown as 
ܭ௧ାଵ = ܭ௧ఏሺ1 − ݈௧ሻଵିఏ − ܿ௧ − ݃௧. (15) 
The marginal cost to increase ݃௧ is one. On the other hand, the marginal cost to increase ݈௧ is 
ሺ1 − ߠሻܭ௧ఏሺ1 − ݈௧ሻିఏ, which is regarded as the opportunity cost to increase the informal elderly care. 
Therefore, with 1 < ሺ1 − ߠሻܭ௧ఏሺ1 − ݈௧ሻିఏ, that is, if the following inequality holds, informal elderly 
care is socially inefficient. Fully public elderly care should be provided because informal elderly care 
is more costly than public elderly care. 
݈௧ > 1 − ሺ1 − ߠሻ
భ
ഇܭ௧. (16) 
From (6), the condition in which a household selects informal elderly care is 
݈௧ > 1 − ቀ
ఈఛሺଵିఏሻ
ఉ
ቁ
భ
ഇ ܭ௧. (17) 
Therefore, if ߬ = ఉ
ఈ
, then the condition in which socially informal elderly care should be selected 
is the same as the condition that the household selects. 
 
5. Consumption Tax 
This section presents examination of the consumption tax effect on ܭ௧ାଵ as further taxation. If the 
consumption tax is used to finance public elderly care, then the government budget constraint changes 
to 
߬௖ܿ௧ = ݃௧. (18) 
Then, the dynamics of ܭ௧  is given as 
ܭ௧ାଵ = ሺ1 − ߠሻܭ௧ఏሺ1 − ݈௧ሻଵିఏ. (19) 
Therefore, with the same public elderly care ݃௧ in the case of both income taxation and consumption 
taxation, ܭ௧ାଵ is pulled up and capital accumulation is facilitated. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper sets the model with public elderly care as formal elderly care and with family care as 
informal elderly care. Using the model, one can examine how capital accumulation and the labor 
supply are determined. In addition, this paper presents an examination of whether the public elderly 
care to increase the labor supply should be provided or not. Although informal elderly care should be 
regarded as decreasing because of the labor supply in an aging society with fewer children, this paper 
presents the equilibrium in which informal elderly care should exist. Moreover, this paper presents 
results of an examination of a consumption tax for financing public elderly care. Results demonstrate 
that reform of elderly care should be considered. 
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Fig. 1: Unique Solution of ݈௧ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Steady State Equilibrium 
݈௧ 
ܮ, ܴ 
ܮ 
ܴ 
߬, ܭ௧ ↑ 
ܭ௧ 
ܭ௧ାଵ = ܭ௧ 
ܭ௧ାଵ 
